set the.level of AFDC benefits, must pay
This hypothesis has been examined previously by Hulten et al. (1982) , Gram-I. Introduction lich (1982) , Orr (1979) , and Plotnick and decline in real AFDC benefits Winters (1985) . Orr found that Food over Stamps substituted for AFDC benefits on the 1970s and 1980s is one of the most a one-for-one basis, while Gramlich and widely noted trends in the U.S. welfare Plotnick and Winters found no substitusystem in recent years. It has been used tion. Hulten et al. found evidence of subas part of the explanation for the reversal stitution but stressed the extreme non-roin the historic decrease in poverty rates bustness of all estimates of the substitution that occurred around 1980, when poverty effect. The variance in results in these rates started rising. The benefit decline is studies may be, in part, a reflection of a often cited in the popular press as evikey difficulty in testing the hypothesis. dence for a growing conservative climate, Because the Food Stamp benefit schedule and it has played a role in recent welfare is uniform in the nation as a whole, a crossreform discussions in Washington over sectional regression of state_specific AFDC arguments for a federally mandated min-, imum state AFDC benefit (Moynihan L)enefits on a standardized Food Stamp I benefit is not possible. Moreover, the 1986, pp. 15, 113) . It has also been used number of time periods available over the as an argument against the thesis that 1970s and'1980s is too small to conduct a AFDC destabilizes marital unions, since reliable time-series analysis, and in any the increases in the divorce rate and in case the evidence is strong that the states female family headship in the United were not in equilibrium in those years. The States have occurred over the same pestudies just noted attempted to circumriod that AFDC benefits have fallen.
vent this problem by using various sources The alternate explanation explored in of cross-sectional variation in the Food this paper is that the decline reflects a Stamp benefit actually paid out in a state substitution of federally-funded Food to identify the Food Stamp substitution Stamp benefits for partially state-funded effect. However, the validity of using such AFDC benefits. State legislatures, which variation to measure the substitution effect is subject to question and, in any *Brown University, Providence, RI 02912. event, the amount of such variation is 123 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLIII small; hence the instability of the ei3ti-II. The Tbue-Series Evidence and mated effect. the Institutional Background In this paper a more indirect method of attack is taken. Cross-sectional regres-A relatively brief graphic exposition of sions of AFDC benefits are estimated at the relevant trends should provide a proper a point in time (1960) prior to the introcontext for the econometric work. The duction of Food Stamps, and the results dramatic reduction in real AFDC benefits are then used to forecast the sum of AFDC since the late 1960s is illustrated in Figand Food Stamps at a significantly later ure 1. As the figure indicates, the real time (the 1980s) after the states had prebenefit grew steadily into the early 1960s sumably adjusted to the introduction of and accelerated slightly in the mid-1960s. Food Stamps. If the substitution hypothBut around 1967 or 1968, the increase esis is correct, the 1960 regression should came to a halt and benefits took a sharp correctly forecast the later sum. This nosedive, setting off a decline that continmethod, while straightforward, is also ued all the way to 1981. Since 1981 the fairly heroic. Time-series forecasts from benefit has leveled off and has remained cross-sectional regressions are notoessentially constant. riously poor and, in this case, there is an That changes in the U.S. political cliadditional difficulty created by the vir-mate leading to more conservative politual transformation of the U.S. welfare cies occurred at about the same time as system between 1960 and 1984, making the benefit decline leads to the obvious it perhaps unlikely that there has been hypothesis that the benefit reduction has no structural change in the AFDC benefit resulted from changes in preferences toequation.
ward redistribution. State legislatures, Given these difficulties, the results in-which set AFDC benefits, are traditiondicate surprisingly strong support for the ally more conservative than the Congress substitution hypothesis. Forecasts of the and could be argued to be particularly real 1984 benefit are much higher than susceptible to changes in the attitudes of the actual AFDC-Food-Stamp sum but are voters. Nevertheless, there could be ecovery close to the sum including Medicaid.
nomic causes of the change as well, and The AFDC benefit in 1960 was $300 per these clearly need to be explored. month lower than the sum of AFDC, Food
One such alternative hypothesis is sugStamps, and Medicaid in 1984, but a pregested by the trend in the AFDC casediction of the 1984 benefit sum from a 1960 load, also shown in Figure 1 . The increase regression comes within $10 of the actual in the benefit in the early 1960s was fol-1984 benefit sum in some specifications. lowed shortly thereafter by an explosion Backcasts from 1984 regressions to 1960 in the AFDC caseload, for the number of sometimes come within $9 of the actual AFDC families per capita almost tripled AFDC benefit in 1960. Finally, almost all over the six years between 1966 and 1972. tests conducted on 1960 and 1984 differIndeed, the benefit started to decline in ences find that the null hypothesis of no almost the same year (1966) that the structural change cannot be rejected.
caseload started to rise. Although the In the next section of the paper, the caseload has since leveled off, the subsebackground time-series trends in the quent reduction in the benefit may sim-AFDC benefit, and in variables that might ply have been a lagged response to the have caused its decline, are discussed. The caseload increase; the states may not have models and econometric methods used to been in equilibrium until after 1981. As test the Food Stamp hypothesis are dis-should be quite intuitive, and as will be cussed in Section III, followed by a pre-demonstrated formally below, the casesentation of the main results in Section load is effectively the price of the benefit; IV. A summary and a discussion of the consequently, the caseload explosion reppolicy implications of the paper are pro-resented a 300 percent increase in the price vided in the last section.
of AFDC benefits.' though the rate of decline has leveled off. AFDC recipients were automatically eliAs a result, the real AFDC guarantee was gible for Food Stamps, regardless of in-25 percent lower in 1984 than it had been come, and hence almost all AFDC recip- sic set (e.g., by limits on hospital days), it Third, the cash equivalent value of Food is nevertheless the case that the core of Stamps is essentially the same as their Medicaid expenditures is mandated by the market value, making it unlikely that re-federal government and hence is not uncipients would be worse off by having food der the control of the states. transfers substituted for cash transfers. Table 1 , the net sum of AFDC A further source of possible benefit suband Food Stamps in 1984 was $505 per stitution, also related to the Medicaid month, only 5 percent higher than the program, is the substitution of non-AFDC value of AFDC alone in 1960. This is a Medicaid benefits for AFDC-related benrather small increase over the twenty-four efits. AFDC recipients account for only 25 years, given the much higher levels of percent of Medicaid expenditures, the other taxpayer income in 1984. This taxation 75 percent consisting predominately of also implies that a reduction in the state expenditures on the aged and the dis-AFDC benefit by one dollar would lower abled. The average Medicaid benefit for the net transfer to female-headed famithe aged is about double that for AFDC i lies in the state by only 70 cents. Thus an families and that for the disabled is about additional incentive for state legislatures triple that for AFDC families. The exploto let the real AFDC benefit decline is sion in medical care prices in the 1970s provided.
led to tremendous growth in non-AFDC A second source of benefit substitution Medicaid expenditures, particularly for that may have occurred is the substitunursing home care. As shown at the bottion of Medicaid benefits for AFDC. The tom of Figure 2 , non-AFDC Medicaid exMedicaid program was introduced by the penditures per capita grew strongly all the U.S. Congress in 1965 and grew rapidly way into the late 1970s, until medical care over the late 1960s and 1970s, at the same inflation once more generated service retime that AFDC benefits were declining.
ductions. In regard to AFDC benefits, the AFDC recipients are categorically eligisimple implication is that non-AFDC ble for Medicaid benefits so that, even Medicaid expenditures may have crowded though not all receive medical care in any out AFDC Medicaid expenditures and the given time interval, all are essentially AFDC benefit itself in the state budget; covered by health insurance and hence that is, the two may be substitutes in the should be thought of as receiving a transstate utility function.4 fer. As in the AFDC program, state legTesting the Hypothesis. The goal of the islatures pay for Medicaid expenditures, analysis in the next two sections is to test but payments are matched by the federal these substitution hypotheses against the data, and to determine whether the other place in all counties. The Food Stamp possible causes of benefit decline (case-benefit was multiplied by the fraction of load growth, matching rates, real income the counties in the state that had instigrowth slowdown) are sufficient by themtuted the program. However, as discussed selves, either alone or in combination, to by Orr (1979) , the states that adopted the explain it instead. The central difficulty program first were the more liberal, highin testing the Food Stamp portion of the benefit states; thus the Plotnick-Winters hypothesis, which is the primary one, is variable runs the risk of some degree of that the Food Stamp benefit schedule is endogeneity. On the other hand, Gramset by Congress and does not vary across lich (1982) used time-series variation in the states. Consequently, no cross-secthe Food Stamp benefit from 1974 to 1981 6 tional correlation between AFDC and Food to estimate the substitution effect. Stamp benefits can be estimated.
Gramlich found his results to be quite In past studies of the substitution hy-sensitive to the specification assumed. This pothesis, this difficulty has been circumis not too surprising for, as Table 1 above vented in various ways. Orr (1979) con-shows, the AFDC benefit fell from 1974 ducted a cross-sectional analysis in the to 1981 and the Food Stamp benefit flucmid-1970s and regressed the AFDC bentuated with little or no pattern. In fact, efit on the average Food Stamp benefit given the long-standing decline of the actually paid in each state. The Food AFDC benefit prior to 1974 and its levStamp benefit actually paid differs across eling off after 1981, it is unlikely that the states because of differences in family size, states were in equilibrium over the 1974-nonwelfare income, and the amounts of 1981 period. various deductions in the benefit forThus the central problems in testing the mula.' However, legislatures set the hypothesis are that (1) Food Stamp effects guarantee in the benefit formula-which cannot be estimated with cross-sectional holds family size, other income, etc. condata and (2) such effects cannot be relistant-and not the benefit paid out. In ably estimated with time-series data since addition, econometrically speaking, identhere are too few observations and too tifying the effect of Food Stamps by using much of an indication that the states were variation in family size and other varinot in equilibrium for most of the years ables requires the assumption that those available. To avoid these difficulties, this variables do not affect state AFDC ac-study takes an indirect approach to the tions directly, which is unlikely to be the essentially time-series nature of the quescase. Moreover, the variation in family size tion (i.e., why did AFDC benefits decline and other variables across states is not over a specific calendar period?) by avoidvery large, which could lead to unstable ing the direct estimation of Food Stamp results. A reanalysis of the Orr data by effects altogether, and by using cross-sec- Hulten et al. (1982) is consistent with this tional AFDC benefit equations estimated possibility, for Hulten et al. found the Food prior to the introduction of Food Stamps Stamp coemcient in the Orr model to be and Medicaid to forecast benefits forward quite sensitive to the inclusion of addito a period in the future when states had tional state-specific variables. Finally, refully adjusted to Food Stamps and Medicgardless of the legitimacy of family size aid. Pre-1965 benefit regressions are used and other such variables as instruments, to forecast the effects of changes in the the cross-sectional variation in the Food caseload, matching rates, and state inStamp benefit they induce is unlikely to come on the benefit, and comparisons of have the same effect on the AFDC benefit the forecasted mean benefit and the acas will an upward shift in the entire Food tual mean benefit are then used to test Stamp schedule, as bar, occurred over time.
for structural change in the AFDC ben- Plotnick and Winters (1985) Thus an increase in F of $1 will lower B tizne-series correlations in the 1970s, when by $1, controlling for income effects. Not the states appear not to have been in controlling for such effects will generate equilibrium, to test for substitution.
a reduction of B of less than $1.
As noted in the previous section, a fully rational voter will realize that the Food 111.
ModeUng the Effect of Food
Stamp program taxes AFDC benefits, Stamps and Medicaid on AFDC leading to a variation on this model.
Since most of the regressions to be estimated will be based upon only 48 ob-Model IA Max U(B + *F', Z), (5) servations, the models must be kept as B.t. y = pB + Z, (6) simple as possible. In the simplest, the median voter of each state allocates his F' = F -.3B, 
family size (e.g., four); F is the Food Stamp Medicaid benefits can be introduced to guarantee for the same family size; Z is this model in a similar fashion, leading to the per capita amount of some other comModel II: posite good; Y is per capita income in the state after federal taxes but before state Model II Max U(B + *F + 4@M, Z), (10) taxes;' and P is the price of the AFDC benefit. P is equal to (CIN)(1-s), where C s.t. Y = P(B + QM) + Z, (11) is the AFDC caseload, N is state population, and s is the federal matching rate where M is the insurance value of the for AFDC expenditures. Approximating
Medicaid benefit for AFDC recipients and the solution to the maximization problem Q is the relative price of medical care.10 for B with a linear demand equation, we
The resulting demand equation for B can have be written;
where 'k = Y + *PF is virtual income, where
incorporating the income effects arising The income effects in the virtual-income from the federal gift of Food Stamps. Theterms are in this case partly negative ory predicts that P < 0 and -y > 0. Here (-QPM) because the federal "gift" of interest centers on tests of the null by-Medicaid is not free-states must still pay 
Testing the Null Hypotheses. As disFinally, the influence of non-AFDC cussed in the last section, the approach Medicaid expenditures can be incorpotaken here to testing the nulls of dollarrated by modifying the utility function to for-dollar substitution is based upon foreallow a third argument representing the casts from cross-sectional regressions for transfer to non-AFDC Medicaid recipi-B estimated prior to the introduction of ents, primarily the aged and disabled. A Food Stamps and Medicaid. The earliest separate argument is required because the year for which the AFDC guarantee for a marginal utility of transfers to the aged family of four is available is 1960 and the and disabled is likely to be quite different latest year for which it and the indepenfrom that of transfers to female heads of dent variables are available at the time family. As noted in the previous section, of this analysis is 1984." Both years can Medicaid transfers to the aged and dis-be reasonably argued to be equilibrium abled are much greater than to female years, for in 1960 the AFDC system had family heads, which could be interpreted been stable in structure and in caseload as evidence that the marginal utility of growth for over a decade and in 1984 the transfers to the former are higher than to AFDC benefit appears to have settled the latter.
down after the transitional years in the 1970s. However, years prior to 1984 will
14
Model III Max U(B + @F + 40M, be examined as well.
Cross-sectional regressions of B on P and y in 1960 can be used to forecast the s.t. Y = P(B + QM) + QPNMN + Z, (16) AFDC benefit under Models I and 11 to 1984, and significance tests can be conwhere MN is the Medicaid benefit to nonducted on the difference between the fore-AFDC recipients and PN is the price of that casted and actual mean AFDC benefit in benefit, equal to the product of (1-s) and that year. However, Model III cannot be the per capita caseload in the non-AFDC estimated on 1960 data because data on portion of the Medicaid program." The PN are unavailable then. The tests for demand equation for B now becomes Models I and II will indirectly determine the extent to which changes in the level of the caseload, matching rates, and dis-B Ot+ PP + S(QPN) + posable income between the years are ca- Perhaps more important for present purl to III on the 1984 cross-section and by poses, the inclusion of these variables has using them to predict the 1960 benefit. no quantitatively important effect on the Such estimates obviously incorporate dif-income coefficient, but it does reduce the ferent statistical information, particumagnitude of the price effects greatly and larly that on Medicaid, and Model III can renders them completely insignificant. also be estimated. Conditional upon the Thus the 1960 data provide weak evioutcome of this analysis, a further set of dence of price effects at best. tests can be conducted by pooling the two Forecasts to 1984 are shown in Table 4 years and testing directly for structural for Models I and II (Model HI cannot be change in the parameters, thereby using forecasted because no estimate of the paall the statistical information in the data.
rameter 6 is possible with the 1960 data). The means of the variables used in the Forecasts using the coefficients in colanalysis are shown in Table 2 .'5 As noted umns (1) and (2) in Table 3 are given. In previously, the mean AFDC guarantee fell column (1), the forecasted benefit in 1984 markedly between 1960 and 1984, but is $645 per month, considerably above the Food Stamps and Medicaid outweighed the actual AFDC benefit of $344, But this AFDC decline. The caseload more than forecast is only $60 above the sum of tripled, leading to a large effective price AFDC and Food Stamps in 1984, a fairly increase." The matching rate appears to close forecast. The forecast is insignifihave increased slightly over the period.
cantly different from the actual value, The 1960 value of the matching rate is the though this is partly a result of a high rate applicable at the mean benefit in the standard error of the prediction ($156). The sample, for the matching schedule was forecast of the model under the assumpnonlinear in that year. 17 The Table 3 shows the results of estimating icaid (Models 11 and IIA), the 1960 regresthe 1960 AFDC benefit equations. Col-sions underpredict because the Medicaid umn (1), the simplest model, shows a sig-benefit is about $180. The forecast error nificant and positive income effect and a ranges from $125 to $130, but is again innegative, though insignificant, price ef-significantly different from zero. For Model fect. At the means of the data the coeffi-11, the implied benefit increase is $305 cients imply price and income elasticities ($770-$465) , and the 1960 regression of -.17 and .98, respectively. The nearpredicts two-thirds of that increase. The unity income elasticity implies that the estimates in column (2), those from the share of income devoted to AFDC should 1960 regression including region and stay approximately constant as income metro variables, are much farther off from increases.
-the AFDC-plus-Food-Stamp total but are Columns (2) and (3) show the effects of much closer to the benefit sum including entering additional state variables for re-Medicaid, coming as close as $10 for Model gion, urbanization, educational level of the 11. population, and other factors. Region apOne of the restrictions in the model is pears to bb moderately important in ex-the assumption that both components of plaining benefits, with the South showing the price, (C/N) and (1- Table  3. busing estimates from column (2) in Table  3 .
CLess than 0.005. in the caseload have less of a negative ef-benefit sum including Medicaid very acfect than increase in the price from the curately, coming within $3 to $5 of the matching rate, consistent with the hy-$770 total. pothesis just mentioned. However, all price Some tests were also performed exameffects are quite insignificant, so the reining regional differentials. Using the results are not strong. The forecasts shown sults of column (2) in Figure 3 , which shows the edly legislators also failed to perceive and trends in actual benefits and in the bento react to the increase in in-kind benefits efit forecasts from columns (1) and (2) of instantaneously as well, further contrib- Table 3 . The figure shows decline in benuting to a lag in the legislative reefits over the latter half of the 1970s and sponse." the early 1980s clearly, as was also shown
The estimates of Models I to III on the 22 in Table 1 . The predicted benefits, on the 1984 data are presented in Table 6 . The other hand, rise over time, though at results are for the most part quite similar varying rates depending upon the rates of to those in 1960. Price effects, though income and caseload growth. Both of the negative, are on the borderline of signifpredicted values appear to be approachicance at conventional levels in most of ing the benefit sum including Medicaid, the models. Even in those models (RA and particularly the predicted value from the IIIA) where price effects are significant, regression including regional and metro the implied elasticities are quite low (about variables (specification (2)).
12 percent). Income effects, on the other The seeming convergence of the actual hand, are positive and significant in all and predicted benefits, at least when models. The implied elasticities center Medicaid is included in the benefit sum, around .94, once again quite close to unity supports the argument that the latter half and therefore again implying constant (7) into (5) shows that the "beneflv' in this cm is Bw + *F. Thus the difference between ability of states to counter federal transthis model and the previous one is that B is multifer policy, or the establishment of a minplied by here by w. Thus the "benefit" Bw is a linear imum benefit would constrain that abilfunction of price and income, although in this case ity. Optimal federal policy under these price is P/w. Equation (8), when multiplied through by w, shows this linear fimction. Note also that the conditions should be a topic for future rei,,trodution of the tax rate has ambiguous effects on search.
the level of the benefit. While the price effect tends to make the tax effect negative, the income effect moves it in the opposite direction. The tax rate also has am-ENDNOTES biguous theoretical effects on the substitution effect of F on B. **The author would like to thank Howard Cherloequation (11) assumes that AFDC and Medicaid nick, Robc@-rt Plotnick, and participants of seminars at benefits are matched at the same rate, as will be the the NBER, Brown, CUNY, the University of Marycase for the years used in the analysis. land, and the University of Washington for com-"The matching rate is the same in both portions. mentr.. Con-anents from three anonymous referees were "One could also test nulls on the substitutability also helpful. Financial support was provided by a grant of non-AFDC Medicaid expenditures and AFDC Medfrom the U.S. Department of Health and Human Sericaid expenditures, but this is not directly germane vices to the Institute for Research on Poverty. All erto the question of interest here. In addition, of course, rors and opinions are those of the author and not the perfect substitutability does not correspond to a value sponsoring agency. of 1 for the utility parameter 6. An additional question is whether the changes in lsif the AFDC benefit were used instead of the the caseload are explainable by the changes in the guarantee-even though it is not the theoretically benefit. Although an interesting question, it will not correct vanable-a more extensive analysis could be be examined here. See Moffitt (1990) for a review of conducted. For example, in Figure 1 , a tinie-series the literature on the question. analysis could be conducted that explicitly or implic-'The AFDC benefit per family shown in Figure 1 itly extrapolates the AFDC benefit trend prior to 1968 peaked earlier because there was a steady decline in up into the 1980s. the mean AFDC family size over the period. The "Although it would be desirable to improve the efguarantee is the appropriate variable to examine, but ficiency of the estimates by pooling a set of years either it is not available prior to 1960. before or after the transition period, this is not prac3The increase in the total transfer when Medicaid tical. After 1960, data on the AFDC guarantee are as well as Food Stamps is included was previously next available in 1964 and then in 1968, both years noted by Garfinkel and MeLanahan (1986, pp. 124-uncomfortably zona is also excluded because it has no Medicaid pro
